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Abstract 
This paper considers a hypothetical scheme of green payments to induce inter-specific 
agrobiodiversity in the context of Philippine rice farming. We empirically estimate a model of 
farmer behavior and then simulate the consequences of alternative (hypothetical) PES 
schemes under a fixed budget constraint. We find that, under this particular application, there 
is a clear trade-off between the two policy goals of enhancing biodiversity and poverty 
reduction. Even the totally untargeted lump-sum subsidy would have a larger poverty 
reduction impact than would the first-best conservation subsidy payment scheme. Therefore, 
policymakers would be required to strike a delicate balance between the two competing policy 
objectives. In addition, there is also a clear trade-off between the efficiency of targeted 
conservation payment and the information requirement for implementing subsidy schemes. 
 
Key words: payments for environmental services (PES), biodiversity, conservation, poverty, 
rice, Philippines.  
 
1. Introduction  
There has been an increasing recognition that agriculture produces not only food and 
fibers but it also produces as joint products environmental services that are not traded in 
markets. These environmental services include climate regulation, carbon sequestration, waste 
absorption and breakdown, biodiversity and wildlife conservation, soil and water conservation 
and a host of others. The discussions surrounding those and other environmental 
services/externalities arising from agricultural production, however, appear to be markedly 
different in developed countries, on the one hand, and in developing countries, on the other. In 
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the developed country contexts, including those in East Asia—Taiwan, Korea and Japan—, 
the emphasis tends to be on the positive externalities, while in developing countries the 
environmental concerns arising from agricultural production have often (if not exclusively) 
focused on negative externalities, such as the negative externalities arising from the use of 
chemical fertilizer and pesticides, environmental degradation due to upland cultivation, 
depletion of ground water due to pump irrigation, etc. (IRRI 2004).  
In order to balance the relative lack of focus on positive externalities in the contexts 
of developing agriculture, we consider a hypothetical scheme of payments for environmental 
services (PES) to induce inter-specific agro-biodiversity in the Philippine rice farming. In the 
analyses of PES most of the existing studies focus on efficiency aspects of agricultural 
environmental services payments (see Kurlakova et. al. (2003); Feng, H. et. al. (2004); Feng, 
H. et. al. (2005); Lankowski, J. and M. Ollikainen (2003)). A review by Pagiola et. al. (2005), 
however, points to the possibility of synergies between poverty reduction and efficiency goals. 
They conclude that poverty impacts of these schemes depend on a number of technical and 
economic factors notably the population composition of target areas, targeting schemes, 
tenure security, and the size of the payments itself. In contrast, this study explores potential 
trade-offs between biodiversity conservation and poverty reduction goals. We attempt to 
quantify the magnitude of such trade-offs by empirically estimating a model of farmer 
behavior and then simulating the consequences of alternative (hypothetical) PES schemes 
under a fixed budget constraint.  
Casual reference to the poverty impacts of PES schemes abound in the literature,
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but there have been relatively few empirical studies that examine PES for agriculture and its 
poverty alleviation implications. The intent of this study is somewhat similar to Alix-Garcia et. 
al. (2004), who empirically addressed the conservation-poverty link in a different context, i.e., 
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that of PES for watershed management. Antle and Stoorvogel (2006), on the other hand, 
looked at agricultural “green subsidies” and poverty, but the focus is on carbon sequestration 
functions of agriculture. They used a simulation model to explore the potential impacts of 
payments for agricultural soil carbon sequestration on poverty and farm households and the 
sustainability of agricultural systems. They find support for the claim that carbon payment 
contracts provide sufficient incentives for farmers to shift to sustainable systems while 
reducing poverty.  
Using a nationwide dataset from the Philippines, we focus on the farmer behavior of 
planting traditional rice varieties alongside modern rice varieties, and examine policy 
instruments that could potentially induce farmers to adopt this ‘environmentally friendly 
technology.’ This paper addresses three issues: (1) How much would it cost to induce rice 
farmers to plant traditional varieties, i.e. implementation cost of an intra-species conservation 
payments scheme?; (2) What would be the most effective form of payment scheme as an 
environmental policy instrument?; and (3) What are the poverty implications of these payment 
schemes? In addressing these issues, we pay particular attention to the potential trade-offs 
involved between the higher farm profit from not planting traditional rice varieties (since 
modern rice varieties tend to allow farmers to obtain higher profit through their higher yields) 
and the potential benefits of maintaining biodiversity in rice farming that may not be captured 
(entirely) by individual farmers. Such trade-offs could be particularly acute for relatively 
poorer farmers. From policymakers’ point of view, the potentially efficient (optimal) policies 
for the goal of environmental preservation may not be fully consistent with poverty reduction 
goals. Such potential trade-offs from a policy making point of view is our major focus in the 
following analysis.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Before getting into our empirical 
analyses, in the next section we put into perspectives the sharp contrasts in the ways 
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externalities arising from agricultural production are typically discussed in the developed 
versus the developing country contexts. Section 3 briefly introduces the issue of biodiversity 
conservation in the context of rice farming, in general, and the issue of traditional rice variety, 
in particular. Section 4 presents the empirical model to be used for the analysis. Section 5 is a 
short description of the dataset used. The next three sections present our results; section 6 
presents our results on the determinants of the adoption of traditional variety cultivation, 
while section 7 discusses our results on the determinants of farm profit and the effects of 
traditional variety cultivation on farm profit. Section 8 presents the results of our policy 
simulations, with a focus on the impact of environmental service payment schemes on poverty 
outcomes. The final section concludes.  
2. Contrasting Views on Externalities arising from Agricultural Production between 
Developed and Developing Countries 
 
In order to understand the often-contrasting views about the externalities arising from 
agricultural production between developed and developing countries, it would be useful to 
recall the basic socioeconomic conditions in the rural areas of developed and developing 
counties, where three contrasting factors are particularly noteworthy; income level, the rate of 
population growth and socioeconomic structure of rural societies. First, the level of average 
income is vastly different between developed and developing countries. This has implications, 
for example, for the demand structures; as is well known since the discovery of the Engel’s 
law, while food consumption occupies a large share of the total consumption bundle among 
low-income populations, the food share tends to decline and the demand for other goods and 
services increase as the income level rises, including the demand for clean water, clean air and 
other environmental amenities. Thus, the demand for environmental services is likely to be 
larger in developed countries than in developing countries. This observation is one factor 
giving rise to the notion of the “Environmental Kuznets curve” (e.g., Dasgupta et al. 2002).  
The second crucial difference is the rate of population growth. In general, the 
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population growth is relatively low in developed countries and relatively higher in developing 
countries. In particular, in rural areas of Japan the rate of population growth can often be 
negative, and the farming population (as well as the entire population) is rapidly aging. 
Younger generations in rural areas often tend to prefer non-agricultural occupations to 
farming, and one of the largest challenges for many farm households is to retain/find 
successors when the aging farmers retire. Thus, one of the main aspects of the so called 
‘multifunctionality’ argument in Japan (as well as in other East Asian countries, such as Korea 
and Taiwan) is that abandoning of the lands that were previously farmed leads to either an 
increase in negative externalities or a decrease in positive externalities that had previously 
been provided when the land was under the care of the farmer. In contrast, however, the 
situation in most developing countries is quite different. There is a strong population pressure 
in rural areas of those countries, and in many places the previously uncultivated lands 
(including forest lands) are increasingly placed under agricultural purposes. Population 
pressure is one source of urban migration and such population movements, unlike in 
developed countries, do not usually lead to abandonment of previously farmed land.  
This contrasting direction of population pressures (i.e., increasing population in 
developing countries versus decreasing population in developed countries) seems to be one 
source of the opposing views of agriculture as environmentally friendly or unfriendly. In 
developing country contexts, agricultural production is (quite rightly) regarded as a force of 
destroying environment (e.g., forest clearing for the purpose of crop production) while 
agricultural production is, quite rightly as well in their own contexts, often viewed as a 
protector of environment (e.g., a rice paddy providing larger amount of flood control function 
than would be provided by an abandoned land) in developed countries.  
Finally, different social structures (village economies) in rural areas can give rise to 
contrasting implications for the effects of agricultural prices on rural poverty. Interestingly, 
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one historical legacy that the three East Asian countries where ‘multifunctionality’ argument 
has gained prominence (i.e., Taiwan, South Korea and Japan) have in common is the 
extensive and successful re-distributive land reform in the post-war period. Such land reform 
programs, made possible by the historically rare windows of opportunity to overcome or 
circumvent the typical resistance by the politically-powerful landed class (i.e., the occupation 
by the Allied forces in Japan, the absence of the landed elite in Taiwan and in South Korea), 
virtually eliminated tenant farmers and landless laborer households and established, instead, 
rural economies predominantly consisting of small-scale owner farms (e.g., see Hayami, et al. 
1990). Similar conditions have never been replicated elsewhere in Asia (and, perhaps, 
anywhere else in the world). Today, in many of the rural areas of developing Asia, tenancy is 
still common and the class of the landless laborer households expanded rapidly in many 
countries after the 1970s.  
One major policy implication arising from this contrast has to do with the role of 
agricultural price with regard to rural poverty. Since the average income tend to be lower in 
rural areas than in urban areas in both developed and developing countries, agricultural prices 
can have major implications for poverty in both rich and poor countries. In Japan, for example, 
where the problem of poverty is more of relative rather than absolute poverty, since the rural 
population (who is relatively poorer than the urban population) is predominantly 
owner-farmers (who tend to be net sellers of rice) higher agricultural prices tend to be 
‘pro-poor’ (at least) in rural areas. In contrast, in many developing countries, where a large 
proportion of the rural population is composed of marginal farmers and of the landless who 
are net-buyers of staple food, lower (rather than higher) agricultural prices tend to be 
‘pro-poor.’ One recent report based on household-level survey data, for example, finds that as 
much as 80% of the rural poor (which included small farmers as well as the landless) is 
net-buyers of rice in the rural Philippines (Fuwa 2006). As is well known, in post-war Japan, 
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the government-supported price of rice was kept substantially above the market-clearing price 
level, which partially served as a re-distributive policy in the rapidly growing economy with 
increasing urban-rural disparities. In Japan (as well as in Taiwan and Korea), paying higher 
prices for rice is not only environmentally friendly according to the ‘multifunctionality 
argument’, but it was also pro-poor. In developing countries outside East Asia, however, 
paying higher prices for rice is likely to be anti-poor.  
3. Biodiversity benefits of in situ conservation of traditional rice varieties 
 Any loss of biodiversity is irreversible. Despite the general emphasis on negative 
externalities in developing countries, as we discussed above, in recent years losses in 
biodiversity have been increasingly recognized as a major policy issue in developing, as well 
as in developed, countries. Genetic diversity is an important component for the continuous 
improvements of rice crops as cultivars need to be invigorated every 5 to 15 years to better 
protect them against diseases and pests (IRRI 2004). Furthermore, the recent advances in 
biotechnology have led to a renewed recognition of the importance of maintaining 
biodiversity as the basis for technological breakthroughs. Commercial rice production also 
relies heavily on the genetic diversity of rice as a source of material for plant breeding and 
improvement (IRRI 2004, 25). In addition to the potential roles of traditional rice varieties as 
raw materials for genetic improvements, the use of traditional varieties has been found to be 
potentially effective in controlling certain types of pests. For example, recent experiments 
conducted in the southwestern province of Yunnan, China, have found that intercropping rows 
of different rice varieties can control the rice blast disease ‘that costs the rice industry millions 
of dollars annually.’ The cropping practice allows blast-susceptible traditional varieties to be 
conserved in situ and also reduces the cost of pesticides (IRRI 2004, 27).  
While there exist some estimated 140,000 rice varieties, it is widely recognized that 
the number of rice varieties has declined dramatically, especially since the introduction of the 
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high-yielding rice varieties (HYVs) in the 1960s. In the Philippines alone, there were “more 
than a few thousand” rice varieties grown in the 1950s. Today, only two varieties cover 98% 
of the land planted with rice (IRRI 2004, 24-25).  
In the following analysis, we focus on the practice of growing ‘traditional’ rice 
varieties, i.e., in situ on-farm conservation of traditional varieties, as an environmentally 
friendly agricultural technology that the government might consider encouraging farmers to 
‘adopt.’ The potential advantages of on-farm (in situ) conservation of biodiversity, in contrast 
with ex situ conservation, such as a gene bank, include the following (Tuan et.al., 2003):  
• on-farm conservation conserves the evolutionary processes of local adaptation of 
crops to their environments;  
• it conserves diversity at all levels—the ecosystem, the species, and the genetic 
diversity within species;  
• it conserves ecosystem services critical to the functioning of the Earth’s life-support 
system, thus improving the livelihoods for resource-poor farmers through economic 
and social development;  
• it maintains or increases farmers’ control over and access to crop genetic resources;  
• it ensures farmers’ efforts are an integral part of national PGR systems and involves 
farmers directly in developing options for adding benefits of local crop diversity; and  
• it links the farming community to gene banks for conservation and utilization (Jarvis 
et al. 2000a). 
Due to the absence of sufficient information that would allow us to estimate potential 
values of biodiversity conservation from paddy rice cultivation in the Philippine context, 
however, our focus here is exclusively on the cost side (i.e., how much would it cost to induce 
farmers to adopt farming practices that would provide certain environmental services as 
externalities?) and not on the benefit side (e.g., valuation of environmental services). Needless 
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to say, policy decisions would need to be based on both the cost (as pursued here) and the 
benefit (not pursued here) sides of alternative policy instruments.  
4. The empirical model: treatment effects and the choice of cultivating traditional rice 
variety 
 
 Out empirical approach draws from the literature on microeconometric evaluation of 
programs and policies (see the work of Heckman, 1974; Heckman, 1976; Heckman and Robb, 
1985). These studies have used alternative methods to estimate the value of green subsidies. 
For example, Kurkalova et. al., 2003 estimated the incentive payments in the form of an 
irreversibility and risk premium needed to induce the adoption of conservation tillage. They 
estimate this premium as one that is over and above the compensation for expected profit 
losses. Other studies have resorted to direct questioning or CVM type of techniques to 
estimate adoption subsidies (see Lohr and Park, 1995). Unlike the Antle and Stoorvogel 
(2006) study that used a simulation model to study carbon soil sequestration contracts, we use 
a revealed preference approach in the estimation of green subsidies for rice intra specific 
agrobiodiversity. We employ similar concepts as with Kurkalova et. al., 2003 but limited only 
to compensation for expected profit loss.  
In light of the potential trade-offs between farm profit and conservation, we first 
estimate the likely losses in farm profits due to the adoption of traditional rice variety 
cultivation, and then discuss potential amount of subsidies needed to be provided to the 
farmers as an environmental service payment under alternative policy scenarios. The general 
model that we use in this case study is the following endogenous switching model: 
  π
a
i = Xiβ
a
 + u
a
i     if TV cultivation adopted          (1a) 
   π
na
i, = Xiβ
na
 + u
na
i   if TV cultivation not adopted       (1b)  
         I
*
i = Ziγ + εi                                     (1c) 
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   Ii = 1 (TV cultivation adopted)  if I
*
i >0  
      0 (TV cultivation not adopted) if I
*
i <0  
where π
a
i is the profit of parcel i adopting traditional varieties, while π
na
i is the profit of parcel 
i not adopting traditional varieties. Xi is the respective matrices of independent variables. Ii is 
the indicator variable representing the adoption decision of the farm household on parcel i. 
Households adopt traditional varieties (I=1) if and only if I
*
 > 0, otherwise the farmers plant 
modern varieties only (I=0). The endogenous switching regression model is appropriate if the 
participation or adoption decision is an endogenous choice. Simple OLS estimation is likely 
to yield inconsistent estimates.  
 The first step in calculating incentive payments for technology adoption is to identify 
factors that affect the level of rice farming profits, i.e. estimation of equation (1a)-(1c) 
through a two-stage estimation. Following Maddala (1983, 224-225), we initially estimate 
(1c) using the probit maximum likelihood method. We then use the estimated coefficient 
vector γˆ  to calculate the inverse Mills ratios:  
 E(u
a
i | εi < Ziγ ) = -σ
a
u 
)Z(
)Z(
i
i
γΦ
γφ
 and  
 E(u
na
i | εi > Ziγ ) = σ
na
u 
)Z(1
)Z(
i
i
γΦ−
γφ
, 
which are added to estimate equations (1a) and (1b), respectively, to estimate β
a
 and β
na
 by 
Ordinary Least Squares:  
   π
a
i = Xiβ
a
 - σ
a
u 
)Z(
)Z(
i
i
γΦ
γφ
 + u
a
i         for Ii=1       (1a’) 
   π
na
i, = Xiβ
na
 + σ
na
u 
)Z(1
)Z(
i
i
γΦ−
γφ
 +u
na
i    for Ii=0       (1b’)  
The vector of the determinants of profit Xi include: the age of the household head, its square, 
years of schooling of the head, household size, demographic composition of the household 
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members, the distance from the nearest market, the size of landholding, the share of hilly or 
rolling land areas, irrigation dummy, and province dummy variables. In addition to the 
variables included in the vector Xi, the determinants of technology adoption (Zi) include, as 
identifying instruments, dummy variables for access to drying facilities, access to storage 
facilities and access to extension services. The underlying assumption is that access to those 
post-harvest facilities and access to extension services affect the decision to plant traditional 
varieties but do not directly affect farm profit once the adoption of modern rice varieties is 
controlled for.  
The net benefits from planting traditional varieties then are obtained by calculating 
the counterfactual profit. The counterfactual profit is the expected income if, for instance, a 
non-adopting or pure modern variety farmer is forced to plant traditional varieties on their 
farm. In equation form the subsidy or the net benefit required to compensate a farmer for 
technology shifts can be obtained by: 
   ]0*|[-]0*|[ <<=∆ iaina IEIE ππ                     (2) 
Since there is the possibility of having negative profits, i.e. the actual profit being less than the 
counterfactual profit, then the required subsidy or conservation payments to promote 
agrobiodiversity in the farm is simply: )∆,0min(=subsidy . 
 The next step in our analysis is to assess the likely impact of conservation payments 
on the levels of poverty. The headcount poverty ratio is used to assess the changes in the 
poverty levels with and without the conservation payment scheme. The official provincial 
poverty lines constructed by the National Statistical Coordination Board are used as the basis 
for computing the headcount poverty ratio.  
5. The Data Set 
 The dataset for our analysis is taken from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform 
Program Impact Assessment Project. This data set came from a nationwide survey of 1,855 
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farm households initially collected for the purpose of assessing the impact of the 
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. It contains detailed demographic, socio-economic, 
and farm production data. A total subsample of 1,041 rice farming households was used.  
 Table 1 and 2 are cross tabulations that describe the data set in terms of the number 
of households and parcels under Traditional and Modern Variety cultivation. Around 42% of 
all households planted only modern varieties while 25% were pure traditional variety 
cultivators. The same percentages are observed for the parcels. This means that modern 
varieties are more widely cultivated by households and that more plots are planted solely for 
modern varieties. On the other hand, households who cultivate both traditional and modern 
varieties account for only 23% of the sample. In terms of parcels, only 20% of all parcels are 
planted with both modern and traditional varieties. This means that there is a relatively lower 
level of agrobiodiversity within parcels and geographically.  
Table 1. +umber of Households, by Type of Rice Variety Cultivation 
 No. of HH Not 
Planting Modern 
Varieties 
No. of HH 
Planting Modern 
Varieties 
Total 
No. of HH Not Planting Trad Varieties 108 436 544 
No. of HH Planting Trad Varieties 262 235 497 
Total 370 671 1,041 
 
Table 2. +umber of Parcels, by Type of Rice Variety Cultivation 
 
No. of Parcels 
Not Planted with 
Modern Varieties 
No. of Parcels 
Planted with 
Modern Varieties 
Total 
No. of Parcels Not Planted withTrad 
Varieties 
258 1,075 1,333 
No. of Parcels Planted with Trad 
Varieties 
569 485 1,054 
Total 827 1,560 2,387 
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Table 3. Mean Values of Household Characteristics, by Type of Rice Variety Cultivation 
Variable  Pure Trad Rice 
Farming HH 
(N=262) 
Pure Modern 
Rice Farming HH 
(N=436) 
Both Modern Variety 
and Trad Variety 
Farming HH (N=235) 
Total Income (pesos) 77,182 131,632 101,970 
Age of HH Head 55.6 55.9 56.7 
Education Level of HH 
Head (years) 2.1 2.7 2.4 
HH Size 5.3 5.4 5.2 
Productive Assets (pesos) 15,245 23,047 26,640 
Distance to market (km) 0.44 0.34 0.42 
Access to Drying 
Facilities (dummy) 0.21 0.69 0.72 
Access to Storage 
Facilities (dummy) 0.05 0.14 0.08 
Extension Services 
(dummy) 0.67 0.82 0.75 
Male HH Members (0 - 15 
years old) 0.85 0.84 0.81 
Female HH Members 
(0-15 years old) 0.79 0.70 0.66 
Male HH Members (15 
-60 years old) 1.46 1.57 1.50 
Female HH Members (15 
-60 years old) 1.39 1.53 1.43 
Male HH Members above 
60 years Old 0.35 0.32 0.34 
Total Farm Area (hectare) 6.33 3.38 2.12 
 
In terms of household characteristics, pure traditional variety cultivators tend to have 
lower incomes, lower level of education, fewer productive assets, less access to post harvest 
facilities, are farther away from markets, but have larger farms compared to both pure modern 
variety cultivator. In terms of these same characteristics, agrodiverse rice farming households 
fall in between pure modern variety and traditional cultivators. The overall trend is that for 
most of the mentioned variables, agrodiverse farming households are better than pure 
traditional cultivators but are relatively worst off compared to pure modern variety cultivators. 
These observations suggest that there would be potential opportunity costs in any scheme that 
attempts to induce pure modern variety users to adopt traditional varieties in their farms. 
6. Factors Affecting Rice Variety Choice Among Farmers  
 The results of the probit estimation of adopting traditional rice variety cultivation are 
shown in Table 4. Households with better educated household heads tend to have lower 
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probability of adopting traditional rice varieties in their parcels although the estimated 
coefficient is statistically significant only at 15%. Households with larger amount of 
productive assets are also more likely to adopt traditional rice variety, which is rather 
surprising. Demographic composition of the household also has some effects on the decision 
to adopt traditional rice varieties. In particular, households with more female members 
between the working ages of 15 to 60 are less likely to adopt traditional variety.  
Exposure to extension services also reduces the probability of traditional variety 
adoption. This is not surprising since most extension agents have encouraged adoption of 
modern rice varieties. Furthermore, private seed suppliers and input dealers often provide 
extension services that also promote modern varieties through various contractual 
arrangements. Access to storage and drying facilities also reduces the probability of adoption 
of traditional varieties. This probably just captures the fact that post-harvest facilities in the 
Philippines are not very efficient. In addition, also important is land topography; having larger 
shares of rolling or hilly land areas is associated with a significantly (at 6% level of 
significance) lower probability of traditional rice variety cultivation, which is rather 
surprising.  
 Also shown in Table 4 are the computed marginal effects of each of the variables. 
Having an additional 100,000 peso worth of productive assets is associated with 5 percentage 
point increase in the probability of adopting traditional varieties, while additional year of 
schooling lowers the adoption probability by a 2 percentage point. Exposure to extension 
services appears to have quantitatively large effects, a 9 percentage point increase in the 
probability of adoption.  
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Table 4. Probit Estimation of the Choice of Planting Traditional Rice Varieties 
Variable Coefficient P-value Marginal Effects 
Age of Household Head (year)  -0.008 0.698 0.003 
Age of Household Head Squared (year) 0.000 0.808 0.000 
Education of Household Head (year) -0.025 0.154 -0.010 
Household Size  0.024 0.564 0.010 
Assets (pesos)  1.74e-06
**
 0.002 0.0691 (per 100,000) 
Male HH Members (0 - 15 years old) -0.046 0.360 -0.019 
Female HH Members (0-15 years old) 0.021 0.672 0.009 
Male HH Members (15 -60 years old) -0.031 0.507 -0.013 
Female HH Members (15 -60 years old) -0.116
**
 0.011 -0.046 
Male HH Members above 60 years Old 0.054 0.54 0.021 
Distance to Market (km) 0.000 0.977 0.000 
Access to Drying Facilities (dummy) -0.164
**
 0.017 -0.065 
Access to Storage Facilities (dummy) -0.215
**
 0.040 -0.084 
Extension Services (dummy) -0.288
**
 0.000 -0.114 
Land Allocation (hectare) -0.072 0.007 -0.029 
Share of hilly land  -0.157
*
 0.086 -0.063 
Irrigated  -0.099 0.130 -0.039 
Constant※ 0.898 0.159  
Log likelihood -1487.44   
Pseudo R2 0.1202   
**
  - significant at 5% level 
*
 - significant at 10% level  
※
 provincial dummies are also included but not reported here.  
7. Rice Farming Profits and Traditional Varieties  
Table 5 and Table 6 show the estimation results of the determinants of farm profit per 
hectare using endogenous switching regression model (i.e., equations 1a’ and 1b’, 
respectively): table 5 corresponds to the parcels planted with traditional varieties (TV 
‘regime’) and table 6 corresponds to the parcels not planted with traditional varieties. The 
signs of the coefficients are mostly the same between the two ‘regimes.’ One contrasting point 
estimates are, however, the education of household head; the estimated coefficient is negative 
for TV parcels while it is positive for non-TV parcels although the coefficient is only 
marginally statistically significant only for the latter.  
Also the negative coefficient on the size of land, under the both ‘regimes,’ suggests 
diminishing returns to scale, in line with the often-found empirical regularity in developing 
agriculture of the “inverse relationship between land size and productivity.” The point 
estimate of the magnitude of the inverse relations, however, is about twice as large on TV 
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parcels as it is on non-TV parcels. Not surprisingly, the amount of productive assets (other 
than land), such as agricultural machinery, is positively and significantly associated with per 
hectare profit in both cases. As expected as well, access to irrigation has significantly positive 
effects on profit only for modern variety cultivation but not for TV cultivation.  
Table 5. Determinants of Rice Farm Profit (per hectare): TV adopters 
Variable Coefficient P-value 
Age of Household Head -168.759 0.56 
Age of Household Head squared 3.077 0.22 
Education of Household Head -114.126 0.67 
Household Size -403.918 0.51 
Productive Assets 0.0162
**
 0.03 
Male HH Members (0 - 15 years old) 213.442 0.75 
Female HH Members (0-15 years old) 1430.69
*
 0.05 
Male HH Members (15 -60 years old) 463.094 0.53 
Female HH Members (15 -60 years old) 895.381 0.25 
Male HH Members above 60 years Old -375.583 0.78 
Distance to Market -59.130 0.52 
Land Allocation -3360.665
**
 0.00 
Share of hilly land  953.447 0.41 
irrigated (dummy) -361.505 0.73 
Mills ratio 4915.722 0.24 
Constant※ 6812.96 0.44 
R squared 0.2105  
**
  - significant at 5% level  
*
 - significant at 10% level   
※
 provincial dummies are also included but not reported here. 
 
We find that coefficients on the Mill’s ratio is not statistically significant in either 
‘regime,’ implying that the correlation in the error terms between the profit determination 
functions (i. e., equations 1a’ and 1b’) the determinants of the traditional variety adoption (i.e., 
equation 1c) are not strong.
2
  
                                                  
2
 In our earlier estimation without including the provincial fixed-effects (but with regional dummies only) we 
found that the coefficients for the Mills ratios were statistically significant for both equations (as reported in 
Fuwa and Sajise, forthcoming). Thus, it appears that the main sources of endogeneity biases in this particular 
case arise mainly from the unobserved characteristics at the provincial level.  
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Table 6. Determinants of Rice Farm Profit (per hectare): TV non-adopters 
Variable Coefficient P-value 
Age of Household Head 507.293
**
 0.03 
Age of Household Head -3.755
*
 0.07 
Education of Household Head 392.491 0.13 
Household Size -21.249 0.96 
Productive Assets 0.0263
**
 0.04 
Male HH Members (0 - 15 years old) -48.583 0.92 
Female HH Members (0-15 years old) 957.244 0.30 
Male HH Members (15 -60 years old) 297.931 0.60 
Female HH Members (15 -60 years old) -227.145 0.69 
Male HH Members above 60 years Old -139.123 0.90 
Distance to Market -354.057
**
 0.01 
Land Allocation -1404.419
**
 0.00 
Share of hilly land  1148.463 0.76 
irrigated (dummy) 2166.642
**
 0.02 
Mills ratio -2767.464 0.55 
Constant※ -4449.066 0.53 
R squared 0.1486  
**
  - significant at 5% level  
*
 - significant at 10% level 
※
 provincial dummies are also included but not reported here. 
 
8. Conservation Payments and Their Impacts on Poverty Levels 
 The counterfactual rice profit based on equation (1a’) above can provide the 
necessary conservation payment that would compensate households for shifting to more 
agrodiverse rice farms. Under the hypothetical (first best) subsidy for the traditional variety 
introduction scheme, each household currently not planting traditional varieties is assumed to 
be paid a subsidy to compensate for the losses due to the adoption of traditional varieties. The 
estimated subsidy needed for each household is calculated based on the counterfactual profit 
obtained as the fitted value using the regression equation in table 5 applied to the plots 
currently not planted with traditional varieties (i.e., those observations with I=0, which are the 
observations used to estimate equation (1b’) as reported in table 6). The mean subsidy 
payment based on the scheme is estimated to be Php 13,613 per parcel. This direct payment 
scheme would cost the total of around PhP 15,383,216 to implement in total.  
 Under the hypothetical policy scheme of providing subsidies to convert farms 
exclusively planted with modern rice varieties to plant (at least partially) traditional varieties, 
 18 
a total of 514 or 49% of the sample (of 1,041) households in our dataset would be eligible to 
receive such subsidies. Most of these households, on average, have significantly higher 
pre-subsidy incomes, and slightly larger farms than their non-eligible counterparts as shown 
in Table 7. Other household characteristics, such as schooling, age, the value of productive 
assets and household size, are roughly the same between the two groups.  
Table 7. Mean Values of Characteristics of Eligible and +on-Eligible Farmers 
Variable Eligible HH 
(N=514) 
Non Eligible HH 
(N=527) 
Total Income (pesos) 125,113 89,134 
Total rice profit (pesos) 30,567 22,461 
Age of HH Head 55.9 56.4 
Education Level of HH Head (years) 2.6 2.3 
HH Size 5.3 5.3 
Productive Assets (pesos) 21,970 20,115 
Distance to market (km) 0.48 0.43 
Access to Drying Facilities (dummy) 0.41 0.29 
Access to Storage Facilities(dummy) 0.12 0.06 
Extension Services(dummy) 0.79 0.72 
Total Area (ha)  3.05 2.59 
 
 Under this subsidy scheme, the total of PhP 15,383,216 is distributed among 514 
eligible households (1st column in Table 8). Since some of the beneficiary households live 
below the poverty line, this hypothetical subsidy scheme contributes to a modest decline in 
the headcount poverty ratio from 39.0% to 34.3%, a 12% decline in the headcount poverty 
ratio (the 2nd and 3rd column in Table 9). As we have seen, however, those households that 
are not currently planting traditional varieties tend to be slightly better educated and to have 
higher profit and income, thus those households who are likely to be the subsidy recipients 
tend to be relatively better-off households. This suggests a likely trade-off between the policy 
goals of pursuing biodiversity and that of poverty reduction, in this particular context. As a 
benchmark to see such a trade-off, we could consider an alternative hypothetical subsidy 
scheme where the same total amount of PhP 15,383,216 would be distributed equally among 
all households (PhP 14,777 each), a totally untargeted lump-sum subsidy scheme (2nd
t
 
column in Table 8). Such a subsidy scheme would reduce the headcount poverty ratio to 26%, 
 19 
leading to a roughly 34% decline, compared to the 12% decline under the conservation 
subsidy scheme, in the headcount ratio (4
nd
 and 5
rd
 column in Table 9). Under this scheme, 
however, traditional varieties would be introduced only a fraction of the lands; there would be 
an estimated ‘leakage’ of 356 hectares or 23% of the land that would not be converted (at least 
partially) to traditional rice varieties, while 100% of the eligible parcels, by design, would be 
planted (at least partially) with traditional varieties under the ‘first best’ subsidy scheme. Thus, 
even the totally untargeted subsidy payment is much more ‘pro-poor’ than the hypothetical 
conservation payment scheme considered here.  
 In order to assess the potential opportunity costs of the conservation payment scheme 
in terms of poverty reduction, we can alternatively consider a poverty focused uniform 
payment scheme, holding the total subsidy budget constant at PhP 15,383,216, where all the 
households living below the poverty line would receive a uniform amount of PhP 37,890. This 
would obviously be much preferred from poverty reduction standpoint compared to the totally 
untargeted subsidy. Under this payment scheme, the headcount poverty ratio would decline to 
12%, a 68% decline compared to the pre-subsidy poverty incidence (6th and 7th column in 
Table 9). Comparing the headcount poverty ratio under the ‘1
st
 best’ subsidy scheme, 34% 
(found in the 2
nd
 column of Table 9), and the poverty ratio under the ‘uniform poverty 
subsidy’, 12% (found in the 6th column of Table 9), the difference between the two poverty 
ratios (i.e., 22 percentage points) can roughly be seen as the opportunity costs in terms of 
poverty reduction (forgone) for policy makers associated with the conservation subsidy 
payment (a PES) scheme under consideration.  
At the same time, however, the likely ‘leakage’ in land conversion to traditional rice 
varieties would increase to 35% of the eligible parcels from 23% under the totally-untargeted 
subsidy scheme. Our example thus illustrates a case of direct trade-offs between the policy 
goals of biodiversity conservation and poverty reduction. This is essentially because (1) the 
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kind of biodiversity we are considering here involves the adoption of a technology that would 
typically lead to loss in farm profit, (2) those households who are already practicing this 
‘environmentally friendly’ technology tend to be less wealthy farmers while better-off farmers 
tend not be using the technology, and, therefore, (3) the environmental service payment would 
need to be targeted to those non-adopter farmers, who happen to be better-off farmers. As a 
result, given the same amount of budget, a subsidy scheme that is more efficient in inducing 
the adoption of traditional rice varieties is less pro-poor, while more pro-poor subsidy 
schemes tend to be less efficient as conservation payment schemes. In this particular 
application, therefore, policy makers would need to strike a balance between the two 
competing policy objectives.  
 Apart from the possible trade-offs between the environment and poverty reduction 
goals, another potential trade-off that policy makers are likely to face is the possible trade-off 
between the efficiency of payment scheme and the increase in the cost of information required 
for implementing subsidy schemes. The first best subsidy scheme we considered above (i.e., 
1st column of Table 8) assumes that the government is able to elicit the information on both 
the current and the counterfactual profit (where currently non-adopters of traditional varieties 
adopt such a technology) from each household. Since this is rather unrealistic, we could 
consider some other subsidy schemes that are less stringent in information requirement. One 
alternative is to distribute a uniform amount among all the farmers who are currently not 
adopting traditional varieties. Such a subsidy, holding the total subsidy amount constant at 
PhP 15,383,216, would amount to distributing a subsidy of Php 29,928 (in lieu of parcel 
specific subsidy corresponding to prospective profit losses) to each eligible household (where 
the farmer are not currently planting traditional varieties). This subsidy scheme, not 
surprisingly, is less efficient than the first best conservation subsidy scheme (where the 
expected leakage is zero by design) leading to a leakage in land conversion of 11% (4th 
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column of Table 8). The poverty reduction impact under this scheme, however, is larger than 
that of the ‘first best’ conservation scheme considered above; this scheme would lead to a 
25% reduction in poverty incidence, compared to the 12% reduction under the ‘first best’ 
scenario (8th and 9th columns in table 9).  
Table 8. Alterative policy scenarios for conservation/poverty subsidy payment 
 (1) 
household specific 
payment 
(2) 
untargeted 
lump-sum subsidy 
(3) 
uniform poverty 
subsidy 
(4) 
uniform conservation 
payment  
total subsidy cost 
(pesos) 15,383,216 
eligibility criterion 
 
 
non-TV 
cultivators 
expected to incur 
losses from TV 
adoption none 
below poverty 
line 
 
currently not 
planting traditional 
varieties 
number of 
beneficiaries 514 1,041 406 
 
514 
Subsidy amount parcel specific 
uniform among 
households 
uniform among 
poor households 
uniform among MV 
households 
Amount per 
beneficiary 
29,928  
(average) 14,777  37,890  29,928 
Leakage (land areas 
not planted TV) 
(hectares) 
 
 
0 
 
 
355.6  
 
 
551.4 
 
 
169.1  
(% of eligible land) 0 (22.7) (35.2) (10.8) 
 
Table 9. Headcount Poverty Ratio under Alternative Policy Scenarios  
Region 
Status 
Quo 
household 
specific 
payment 
% 
change 
untarget- 
ed 
lump-sum 
subsidy 
% 
change 
uniform 
poverty 
subsidy 
% change 
uniform 
conservati
on 
payment  
% 
change 
all regions 39.0 34.3 -12.1 25.9 -33.6 12.4 -68.2 29.3 -24.9  
 
The leakage share of land conversion under this subsidy scheme (i.e., 11%), however, 
is still much lower compared to the 23% and 35% under the untargeted lump-sum subsidy and 
the poverty-targeted subsidy, respectively. At the same time, however, the poverty reduction 
impact under this subsidy scheme is smaller; the headcount poverty ratio after this subsidy 
scheme is implemented would be 29% compared to 12% under the poverty focused subsidy 
scheme. This last scheme, therefore, might be seen as a middle ground option among the 
alternative payment schemes we have considered here, with a moderate leakage in terms of 
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biodiversity conservation, a relatively modest information requirement and a better poverty 
reduction performance (compared to the first-best conservation payment scheme).
4
  
9. Concluding remarks 
 This case study has shown the poverty implications and the cost of promoting 
agrobiodiversity in rice farming. Poverty effects of a direct conservation scheme appear to be 
quite sensitive to how the specific subsidy scheme is designed. Under this particular 
application of preserving traditional rice varieties in the Philippines, there is a clear trade-off 
between the two policy goals of enhancing biodiversity and poverty reduction. Even the 
totally untargeted lump-sum subsidy would have a larger poverty reduction impact than would 
the first-best conservation subsidy payment scheme. There is also a clear trade-off between 
the efficiency of targeted conservation payment and the information requirement for 
implementing subsidy schemes. While compensating the exact amount of profit losses due to 
technology adoption is obviously more efficient in terms of eliminating possible ‘leakages,’ 
the information requirement for such scheme is perhaps unrealistically high. One interesting 
result of our analysis is that a less informationally stringent, thus less efficient from 
conservation point of view, subsidy scheme is more pro-poor than the efficient subsidy 
scheme. Under this particular policy example, therefore, policy makers are likely to be 
required to strike a delicate balance between the two competing policy objectives.  
 
References 
Alix-Garcia, J., A. de Janvry, and E. Sadoulet. 2004. “Payments for Environmental Services: 
To Whom, For What, and How Much?” Working Paper Department of Agricultural 
and Resource Economics, U.C. at Berkeley. 
 
                                                  
4
 In fact, there would be another issue of potentially perverse incentive effects. That is, the farmers currently 
planting traditional varieties may shift to modern varieties in order to (appear to) be ‘eligible’ for the subsidy 
scheme, which would lead to even larger leakages. While this is a real possibility this issue is not pursued further 
here.  
 23 
Antle, J. M. and J. J. Stoorvogel. 2006. “Agricultural Carbon Sequestration, Poverty and 
Sustainability.” http://www.tradeoffs.montana.edu. 
Boisvert, R., H. Chang, R. Barker, G. Levine, Y. Matusno, D. Molden. 2003. “Refining the 
Positive and Negative Externalities of Taiwanese Paddy Rice Production.” 
Proceedings of Sustainable Development of Water Resources and Management and 
Operation of Participatory Irrigation Organizations Asian Regional Workshop. Vol. 
1. Nov. 10-12. 2004. Taipei.   
Dubin, J.A. and D. L. McFadden. 1984. “An Econometric Analysis of Residential Electric 
Appliance Holdings and Consumption.” Econometrica 52: 345-362.  
Dasgupta, S., B. Laplante, H. Wang and D. Wheeler (2002). “Confronting the Environmental 
Kuznets Curve.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16: 147-168.  
Feng, H., C. L. Kling, and P. W. Gassman. 2004. “Carbon Sequestration, Co-Benefits, and 
Conservation.” CARD Working Paper 04-WP379. 
Feng, H., L.A. Kurlakova, C. L. Kling, and P. W. Gassman. 2005. “Economic and 
Environmental Co-Benefits of Carbon Sequestration in Agricultural Soils: Retiring 
Agricultural Land in the Upper Mississippi River Basin.” CARD Working Paper 
05-WP384  
Fuwa, N. 2006. Report on the 2003 Livelihood System of Rural Household Survey in the 
Philippines. Los Baños: International Rice Research Institute (IRRI).  
Fuwa, N. & A. J. Sajise. 2007. Toward Environmental Services Incentive Policies for the Rice 
Sector: a survey and a Philippine case study. A report submitted to FAO.  
Fuwa, N. & A. J. Sajise. forthcoming. “Exploring Environmental Services Incentive Policies 
for the Philippine Rice Sector: The case of intra-species agro biodiversity 
conservation.” In Zilberman, D., R.Stringer, L.Lipper, and T.Sakuyama (eds). 
Managing Environmental Services in Agricultural Landscapes: Policies and 
Incentives for Poverty Reduction in Developing Countries. New York: Springer.  
Tuan, H.D., N.N. Hue, B.R. Sthapit and D.I. Jarvis (eds.). 2003. “On-farm Management of 
Agricultural Biodiversity in Vietnam.” Proceedings of a Symposium 6–12 December 
2001, Hanoi, Vietnam. International Plant Genetic Resources Institute, Rome, Italy.  
Heckman, J. 1974. “Shadow Prices, Market Wages, and Labor Supply.” Econometrica 42: 
679-94.  
Heckman, J. 1976. “Varieties of Selection Bias.” American Economic Review 80: 313-318.  
Heckman, J. and R. Robb. 1985. “Alternative Methods for Estimating the Impact of 
Interventions.” Journal of Econometrics, 30: 239-267.  
 24 
International Rice Research Institute (IRRI). 2004. IRRI’s Environmental Agenda: an 
approach toward sustainable development. Los Baños: International Rice Research 
Institute.  
Kurkalova, L., C. Kling, and J. Zhao. 2003. “Green Subsidies in Agriculture: Estimating the 
Adoption Costs of Conservation Tillage from Observed Behavior.” CARD Working 
Paper 01-WP 286.  
Lankowski, J. and M. Ollikanen. 2003. “Agrienvironmental Externalities: A framework for 
Designing Targetted Policie.” European Review of Agricultural Economics, 30:51-75. 
Lapitan, A.V. 2005. “Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and Rice Farmers’ 
Technology Adoption Decisions.” Unpublished M.A. Thesis. School of Economics, 
U.P. Diliman.  
Lohr, L. and T. A. Park. 1995. “Utility-Consistent Discrete-Continuous Choices in Soil 
Conservation.” Land Economics 71: 474-490.  
Pagiola, S., A. Arcenas, and G. Platais. 2005. “Can Payments for Environmental Services Help 
Reduce Poverty? An Exploration of the Issues and Evidence to Date From Latin 
America.” World Development, 33: 237-253. 
Wu, J., D. Zilberman, and B. A. Babcock. 2001. “Environmental and Distributional Impacts 
of Conservation Targeting Strategies.” Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management, 41: 333-338.  
 
 
About the authors:  
2obuhiko Fuwa is an Associate Professor of Agricultural Economics at Chiba University, 648 
Matsudo, Matsudo-City, Chiba Japan, and a Visiting Research Fellow at Southeast Asian 
Regional Center for Graduate Study and Research in Agriculture (SEARCA), Los Baños, 
Laguna, Philippines. Asa Jose U. Sajise is an Assistant Professor of Economics, College of 
Economics and Management, University of the Philippines, Los Baños, College, Laguna, 
Philippines. Their research interests are development economics and environmental 
economics, respectively, and each author holds a PhD in Agricultural and Resource 
Economics from the University of California at Berkeley.  
 
